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INTERNATIONAL LAWANDPRACTICE
SYMPOSIUMONDOMESTIC COURTS AS AGENTS
OFDEVELOPMENTOF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Introduction: Domestic Courts as Agents
of Development of International Law∗
ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS∗∗ AND CHRISTIAN J. TAMS∗∗∗
Abstract
This introductory paper to the symposium hosted by the Leiden Journal of International Law,
and edited by the authors, deals with the function of domestic courts as agents for the develop-
ment of international law. The paper ‘sets the scene’ for the contributions to the symposium,
which seek to trace the impact of domestic courts in the development of canonical areas of
international law, such as jurisdiction, immunity, state responsibility, the law of international
organizations/human rights, and the law of armed conﬂict/conduct of hostilities. It discusses
the formal quality and actual inﬂuence of domestic-court decisions on the development of
international-law, and introduces the concept of ‘agents’ of international-law development.
This is the analytical perspective that the contributions to the symposium adopt.
Keywords
sources of international law; development of the law; domestic courts; national courts; inter-
national law-making
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of domestic courts in relation to rules of international law remains complex
and in some respects unclear. To assert the increasing relevance of international law
in domestic proceedings may have become almost commonplace. Contemporary
textbooks tend to engage, at times in depth, with prominent domestic decisions,1
andmany see ‘a certainquantitative andqualitative change’ takingplace,with ‘more
international law [being] applied by more national courts in a more consequential
∗ Many thanks are due to Professors Erika de Wet and Andre´ Nollkaemper, the editors-in-chief of ILDC who
co-organized the Third ILDC Colloquium, for their help in reviewing and editing the contributions to the
symposium; as well as to the editors-in-chief and the editorial board of the Leiden Journal of International Law
for their hard work, help, and patience in the preparation and publication of the symposium.
∗∗ University Lecturer in Public International Law, University of Oxford, and Fellow in Law, St Anne’s College,
Oxford [Antonios.Tzanakopoulos@law.ox.ac.uk].
∗∗∗ Professor of International Law, University of Glasgow [Christian.Tams@glasgow.ac.uk].
1 See A. Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing
International Law’, (2011) 60 ICLQ 57, 58.
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(and less parochial) way’.2 In fact, there is a concerted effort to bring the wealth
of domestic jurisprudence to light through projects like International Law Reports
or International Law in Domestic Courts, and at least an emerging debate about the
need for, and limits of, a ‘comparative approach’ to international law that proceeds
from domestic decisions creating, in one commentator’s terminology, ‘hybrid inter-
national/national norms . . . worthy of study in their own right’.3
Rich though it is, the existing literature on the topic seems quite unbalanced.
There is no shortage of contributions that emphasize the (potentially important)
role of domestic courts as appliers, or enforcers, of international legal rules. Many
studies assess broader functions of domestic courts in the international legal system,
withprominentpieces, for example, stressing their contribution to the international
rule of law, or to unity and coherence more generally.4 But few studies so far have
sought to assess the impact of domestic decisions on the formation and interpret-
ation of broadly deﬁned areas of international law in a systematic way. It is against
this background that thepresent symposiumassesses the roleof ‘DomesticCourts as
Agents of Development of International Law’. The focus is not on the law-applying,
but on the law-developing (perhaps even law-creating) function of domestic juris-
prudence.And it isnoton speciﬁcdecisions– thewell-known ‘textbookexamples’ of
FerriniorPinochet fame–butonbroadlydeﬁnedareasof international law.Proceeding
from traditional ‘textbook papers’ (as opposed to textbook examples of decisions),
contributions seek to clarify the role of domestic courts in the development of inter-
national law in canonical areas (or ‘sectoral regimes’) of the discipline. The attempt
is not to re-engage withwell-known debates about sources, or to trace the relevance
of individual domestic decisions, but to analysewhether, en bloc, domestic jurispru-
dence hasmade an impact on the development of international law in speciﬁc areas
of the discipline.5
This ‘impact assessment’ adds what we consider to be an important, but largely
overlooked, aspect of the role of domestic courts in international law. Admittedly,
it remains selective, perhaps even eclectic, in its coverage: the subsequent con-
tributions cannot address international law in its entirety. Yet in focusing on six
broad topics – jurisdiction, immunities, decisions of international organizations
(especially relating to human rights), international humanitarian law (notably reg-
ulating the conduct of hostilities), and the law of state responsibility (addressed in
two separate papers) – the contributions, we believe, assess relevant and broad areas
2 Y. Shany, ‘National Courts as International Actors: Jurisdictional Implications’ (2009) Federal-
ismi.it no 15/2009, 2, available at http://www.effective-intl-adjudication.org/admin/Reports/2af9ed4d4a026
e581437876dd1b73b87Yuval.pdf.
3 Roberts, supra note 1, 60.
4 See, e.g.,A.Nollkaemper,DomesticCourts and the InternationalRule of Law (2011); J. d’Aspremont, ‘TheSystemic
Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of
the International Legal Order’, in O. K. Fauchald and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), The Practice of International and
National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (2012), 141.
5 Thepresent symposiumcomplements ongoing researchon thedevelopmentof international lawbyanother
potential ‘agent of legal development’, namely the International Court of Justice. See C. J. Tams and J. Sloan
(eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (2013).
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of the discipline. The impact assessment, it is submitted, draws on a relevant sample
of evidence.
This brief introductory contribution aims to set the stage for the thematic papers
that follow. It brieﬂy sketches out the background againstwhich the law-developing
function of domestic courts is to be analysed (section 2), and it introduces thenotion
of ‘agents of legal development’, i.e. the analytical perspective that the authors
were asked to adopt in their papers (section 3). Section 4 presents some general
conclusions.
2. THE BACKGROUND: ROUTINE ENGAGEMENT WITH
DOMESTICATED INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.1. Routine engagement
Writing in 1935, James Brierly noted that ‘questions of international law arise com-
paratively rarely, and often only incidentally, in the work of municipal courts’.6
Seven decades later, in 2005, Lord Binghamwould introduce Shaheed Fatima’sUsing
International Law in Domestic Courtswith the following words:
Times have changed. To an extent almost unimaginable even thirty [let alone seventy]
years ago, national courts in this and other countries are called upon to consider and
resolve issues turning on the correct understanding and application of international
law, not on an occasional basis, now and then, but routinely, and often in cases of great
importance.7
While not everyone back then agreed with Brierly’s assessment,8 Lord Bingham’s
view expressed seven decades later seems generally shared today. In fact, while
both quotations are attributed to writers from the same jurisdiction, the trend
described by Lord Bingham is considered to be a general one. There is a sense –
attested to, not least, by the voluminous materials assembled in the International
Law Reports or in ILDC reports – that domestic courts, not only in Britain, but
on all continents, increasingly, even ‘routinely’, engage with international law. In
fact, many commentators today would see them, as foreshadowed more than a
century ago, as ‘the trusted mouthpieces of international law as local divisions of
the great High Court of Nations’.9 And perhaps this is only natural. As international
law branches out to cover ever-broader areas of international relations and as the
boundarybetweeninternationalandnational legalordersbecomesmoreporous, the
potential for interaction increases. In fact,more than that, not onlyhas international
law branched out, it also penetrates domestic legal systems more than before. A
signiﬁcant number of modern international obligations do not deal simply with
relationsbetween states on the international level, as do, for example, the traditional
rules of the prohibition of the use of force, the prohibition of intervention, or the
6 J. L. Brierly, ‘International Law in England’, (1935) 51 LQR 24, 25.
7 T. Bingham, ‘Preface’, in Shaheed Fatima,Using International Law in Domestic Courts (2005), xi.
8 Cf. H. Lauterpacht, ‘Municipal Decisions as a Source of International Law’, (1929) 10 British Yearbook of
International Law 65, 71.
9 T. A.Walker, The Science of International Law (1893), 49.
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right to visit and search on the high seas. Rather, international obligations – in ﬁelds
as diverse as human rights, environmental protection, investment, and trade, or the
secondary law of international organizations – are becoming increasingly ‘inward-
looking’ in that they demand a state to take, or refrain from, certain conduct within
its domestic jurisdiction, or in that they enable certain conductwithin the domestic
jurisdiction, often within speciﬁc parameters.10 These inward-looking obligations
are imposed on the state, not speciﬁcally on its courts. International law sees the
state as unitary, as one entity that has the freedom to set up its organic apparatus as
it sees ﬁt, but whose organs’ conduct is attributable to the state and may render it
responsible if that conduct is not in conformity with what is required by the state’s
international obligations. Even though the state is free to organize its apparatus,
international law increasingly shapes the state’s ‘internal organisation’. It does so
by requiring, through inward-looking norms, executive or legislative action, and
by ‘using’ domestic courts to oversee the implementation of the relevant rules.11
Both factors – increasing scope, and increasingly inward-oriented reach – explain
whydomestic courts today routinely engagewith international law. It is against this
background that inquiries into the law-developing function of domestic decisions
are called for.
2.2. Domesticated international law
However, is it really ‘international law proper’ that is being engaged with? As noted
above, one reason explaining the increasingpotential for interaction is that national
jurisdictions themselves have becomemore porous, have opened up to, in fact often
embraced, international law. Yet the international law that is being embraced does
not remain unchanged: in the embrace, it is domesticated. Forms and versions of
such domestication have been studied in depth elsewhere. For present purposes, it
is sufﬁcient to draw attention to three common processes.
The ﬁrst process concerns the formal linkage between the domestic and inter-
national legal orders. Depending on the applicable domestic law, international law
may be automatically incorporated into domestic law, or it may need to be trans-
formed before it is invoked before or applied by a domestic court. As is well known,
many legal orders adoptmixed approaches, for example, allowing for the automatic
incorporation of customwhile requiring incorporation of treaties.12
At the same time, second, there are mechanisms which soften the blunt effects
of both incorporation and transformation: while international law (or parts of it)
may be automatically incorporated in domestic law, itmaynot be directly invocable
before and applicable by the domestic court because it is not self-executing, or on
10 See further A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial Function
ofNational Courts’, (2011) 34 Loyola of LA Int’l &CompLRev 133, 138–40, with further references; and cf. A.
Tzanakopoulos, ‘Preliminary Report of the ILA Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic
Courts with International Law’, in International LawAssociation, Report of the Seventy-Fifth Conference Held in
Soﬁa 26–30 August 2012 (forthcoming), para. 12.
11 See generally A.-M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The
EuropeanWay of Law)’, (2006) 47 Harvard Int’l LJ 327.
12 As, for example, is roughly the case in the United Kingdom.
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the basis of other ‘avoidance techniques’.13 Conversely,while international lawmay
need to be transformed before it is invoked before and applicable by the domestic
court, it may still be taken into account in determining a claim before the court
through theprinciple of consistent interpretation, requiring domestic lawgenerally
to be construed in conformity with international law. However, just as with respect
to incorporationandtransformation,domestic legalordersdiffer in theirhandlingof
‘avoidance techniques’ and accord differentweight to the the principle of consistent
interpretation.14
Finally, third, domestic law will often contain rules that coincide in substance
with rules of international law. In fact, many of the inward-looking rules of inter-
national law seek to ensure precisely such coincidence: while harmonization con-
ventions envisaging uniform (national) laws constituted early examples, today’s
debates (reﬂected in the subsequent contributions) focus on individual rights, or
rules of interpretation and state responsibility.15 These ‘consubstantial’ normsmay
lead to the ‘unconscious’ interpretation and application of the substance of inter-
national law by the domestic court.16 Conversely, domestication of international
law may result in ‘hybridization’, with the international norm being ‘fused’ with
domestic-law concepts.17
The processes described are not mutually exclusive, but often complement each
other. Taken together, they complicate the position of domesticated international
law in domestic legal systems considerably. Whether an international legal rule
is incorporated or transformed, whether it informs the interpretation of domestic
law through the principle of consistent interpretation, or whether it has led states
to codify consubstantial domestic law then invoked in proceedings – in all these
instances it may be difﬁcult to discern if and when an international norm is at bar
and to what extent a domestic decision applying and interpreting a norm of inter-
national provenance is really relevant from an international legal perspective. The
subsequent contributions reﬂect theuncertain status of ‘domesticated international
law’. At times, authors stress that even though they engage with topics addressed
under international law, domestic courts typically apply domestic law – and hence
could not be said to have developed international law.18 Others are less concerned
about the formally domestic nature of legal rules; to them, ‘domestication’ does not
deprive theoriginal source of the rules appliedof its character as international law.19
At thepresent stageof theacademicdebate, bothapproaches indeedseemdefensible:
it is a matter of perspective and assumption, not one of ‘right or wrong’. What the
13 See generally E. Benvenisti, ‘JudicialMisgivings Regarding theApplication of International Law:AnAnalysis
of the Attitudes of National Courts’, (1993) 4 EJIL 159.
14 See Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law’, supra note 10, 155–8, and ‘Preliminary Report
of the ILA Study Group’, supra note 10, paras. 21–23.
15 See A. Nollkaemper, ‘InternationallyWrongful Acts in Domestic Courts’, (2007) 101 AJIL 760, 761–2.
16 On consubstantial rules see further Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law’, supra note 10,
143–4 and 158, and ‘Preliminary Report of the ILA Study Group’, supra note 10, para. 29.
17 Roberts, supra note 1, 74–6; cf. K. Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts’, (2000) 32
NYU JILP 501, 505–6; R. van Alebeek in this symposium.
18 See notably arguments made in the contributions by R. O’Keefe and S. Olleson in this symposium.
19 See, e.g., the contribution by R. van Alebeek in this symposium; and see Lauterpacht, supra note 8, 75.
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preceding sectionhas hopefullymade clear is that the diverse processes of domestic-
ation can obscure the position of international law in domestic proceedings.While
domestic courts now routinely engage with issues addressed in international law,
they often do not do so in a straightforwardway. Thismakes itmore difﬁcult to eval-
uate the impact of domestic-court decisions on the development of international
law.
3. THE ANGLE: COURTS AS AGENTS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
In assessing the impact of domestic decisions on the development of international
law in ‘their’ area, contributors adopt different standards and reach different results.
Notwithstanding their diversity, the contributions adopt a common perspective
on the role of domestic courts: throughout, the inquiries assess whether domestic
courts have been relevant ‘agents of legal development’. The term – introduced by
Lauterpacht20 and since taken up by Sir Franklin Berman21 – is meant to permit
a nuanced appreciation of the role of courts in the development of international
law. While Lauterpacht used it to describe the role of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (and later the ICJ), the concept of ‘agency’ can be applied to all
participants contributing to the process of legal development, including domestic
courts. ‘Agent’ is used in a broad sense, denoting a capacity to inﬂuence processes –
in this case: processes of legal development. Agents can be powerful or weak, and
their strengthmay vary across areas – as is indeed the case with respect to domestic
courts. Finally, and most importantly, agents operate within systems that empower
or constrain them – in our setting, domestic courts are part of a broader process
of international legal development shaped notably by the doctrine of sources of
international law. All this is taken for granted in the subsequent contributions, and
mostof this is indeed fairly straightforward.However, twoaspects, bothhighlighting
features of the particular system within which domestic courts operate, deserve to
be spelled out at the outset: ﬁrst, within the regime of sources of international
law, decisions by domestic courts have a very limited formal impact; and, second,
this does not preclude them from exercising an important role in practice. Both
assumptions need to be brieﬂy explored.
3.1. Limited formal impact
Every legalorderneeds tocometo termswith the impactof judicialpronouncements
on positive law. Is the judgemerelymeant to apply existing lawwithout having any
effect on it, just like Montesquieu’s ‘bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi’?22
Or does the judge have a mandate also to develop the law? These questions cause
sharp divisions even when posed within one particular legal system, for example
20 H.Lauterpacht, ‘TheInternationalCourtasanAgencyforDevelopingInternationalLaw’, inTheDevelopmentof
International Lawby the International Court (1958); and alreadyH. Lauterpacht , TheDevelopment of International
Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice (1934), 2.
21 F. Berman, ‘The International Court of Justice as an “Agent” of Legal Development?’, in Tams and Sloan, supra
note 5.
22 Montesquieu,De l’esprit des lois (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6.
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that of international law or of a given domestic legal order.23 They become even
more complicated when the organ of one legal order may have an effect on the
rules of another legal order, i.e. when the domestic judgemay be seen as developing
the rules of international law. Perhaps not surprisingly, international law has only
accepted a fairly limited formal impact of domestic-court decisions. The traditional
perspective in fact sees domestic courts as ‘recipients’ of international law, called
upon to apply (butnot todevelop) it:Walker’s statement, describingdomestic courts
as ‘trusted mouthpieces of International Law as local divisions of the great High
Court of Nations’,24 seems inspired by Montesquieu’s view. Similarly, in the PCIJ’s
famous use of terminology, domestic decisions, like domestic laws, are decidedly not
international law:
[f]rom the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ,
municipal laws aremerely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of
States, in the same manner as do [domestic] legal decisions or administrative measures.25
In that perspective, a domestic decision is to be assessed against an existing (but
purportedly separate) international legal framework, with which it can conform or
which it can violate (entailing state responsibility26).
The traditionalperspective embodied in thePCIJ’s statement, however, is difﬁcult
to square with the doctrine of sources of international law and with general rules
of interpretation. These envisage at least a limited role for domestic decisions.
Most importantly, domestic decisions can constitute an element of state practice
(potentially also expressing the state’s opinio juris). State practice in turn may be a
relevant factor in the determination of customary international law and also – as
‘subsequent practice’ in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT – affect the interpretation
of treatyprovisions.Clearer still, but less relevant inpractice,domesticdecisionsalso
canbe taken into account in the determinationof general principles of lawas set out
inArticle38(1)(c)oftheICJStatute.Noneofthisseemsparticularlycontroversial;and
thus it would bewrong to see domestic-courtsmerely as recipients or ‘mouthpieces’
without any formal impact on the development of international law.27 However,
for a simple reason this formal impact is clearly limited: even if they effectively
determine practice, domestic court decisions reﬂect the position of only one state;
which in and of itself is insufﬁcient to ‘create’ a rule of customary international
23 On the law-making power of the ICJ see, e.g., C. J. Tams and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Barcelona Traction at 40: The
ICJ as anAgent of LegalDevelopment’, (2010) 23 LJIL 781, 782–6; andA. Pellet, ‘Article 38’, inA. Zimmermann
et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2012), mn 322–34, both with further
references.
24 SeeWalker, supra note 9.
25 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, [1926] PCIJ Series A No, 7, at 19 (emphasis added).
26 See Art. 4 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and related
Commentary, reproduced in (2001) II(1) ILC Ybk 31, 40–1, para. 6; for an early treatment see C. Eustathiade`s,
La responsabilite´ internationale de l’e´tat pour les actes des organes judiciaires et le proble`me du de´ni de justice en droit
international (1936); in this symposium see further the contribution by Olleson.
27 Onthe faceof it,Art. 38(1)(d) of the ICJStatute–mentioning ‘judicial decisions’ as ‘as subsidiarymeans for the
determination of rules of law’ – might be added. However, this assumes that ‘judicial decisions’ encompass
domestic decisions (which is at best controversial); and it ignores the fact that in describing judicial decisions
as a ‘means for the determination of rules of law’, Art. 38(1)(d) deals with a material, not a formal, source of
law. See Pellet, supra note 23, mn 307 et seq., esp. 321 with further references.
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law, to shape treaty interpretation through subsequent practice, or to amount to a
general principle of law.28 What is required, in all these instances, is the joint or
parallel conduct of a (large) group of states, thus satisfying requirements of general
practice29 or even of ‘accept[ance] by all nations in foro domestico’.30 Put differently,
while domestic decisions can be integrated into the doctrine of sources and into
processes of treaty interpretation, domestic courts are formally treated just like
other organs of one particular state. This severely limits their formal impact on the
development of international law.
3.2. Potential informal inﬂuence
The formal perspective is important in that it clariﬁes what domestic courts cannot
do: they cannot singlehandedly develop – let alone make – international law. Their
pronouncements are contributions to a broader process of legal development. If
they are found to be unpersuasive, or indeed if they go unnoticed (asmany domestic
pronouncements inthepre-ILRandpre-ILDCeradid), theycannot leaveatrace.How-
ever, if it is takenupandvalidatedor endorsedbyother actors, thennotwithstanding
its limited formal impact, a domestic decision can have an enormous inﬂuence on
the development of international law. To be sure, the inﬂuence is not a formal or
direct one, but informal; and as it depends on external validation, it is by no means
guaranteed. But it cannot be excluded either. Quite to the contrary, where domestic
courts engage with international law in speciﬁc disputes and possibly even rely on
it to justify binding, coercive decisions, they are quite likely to prompt reactions and
to trigger a sequence of events thatmay ultimately result in the development of the
law.31
While processes of legal development do not follow prescribed patterns, three
broad categories of domestic court inﬂuencemay illustrate thepoint. First, domestic
courts can conﬁrm rules of international law through consistent application.32 This
may help consolidate, or stabilize, international legal rules and signal their general
acceptance, thus contributing to legal certainty.33
Second, domestic-court decisionsmay put forward novel interpretations of inter-
national legal rules, extending or limiting their scope, introducing exceptions, and
the like, or may rely on norms whose international legal status is doubtful. This
formally remains a single instance of state practice that has no effect on the content
of the rule – but, if novel, the interpretation and application of the rule call for reac-
tion. If no such reaction is forthcoming, either by the state itself overruling its own
28 The point is made clearly in the contribution by O’Keefe.
29 See, e.g.,North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, 41–2, paras. 71–73.
30 Cf. Lord Phillimore’s explanation of ‘general principles’: Proce`s-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory
Committee of Jurists (1920), 335.
31 As Lord Hoffmann stated in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, para. 63, ‘[i]t is not for a national court
to “develop” international law by unilaterally adopting a version of that law which, however desirable,
forward-looking and reﬂective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states’ (emphasis added).
This concedes that it is for a national court to ‘develop’ international law through a unilateral adoption of
a version of that law, should it be successful in soliciting the agreement, or at least acquiescence, of other
states.
32 See e.g. the contribution by O’Keefe in this symposium.
33 Cf. the contribution by Olleson in this symposium.
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court,34 or by other states protesting against the novel interpretation or application
of the relevant rule, acquiescence by other actorsmay be legally signiﬁcant, and the
seeds for development of the law along the lines ‘suggested’ by the domestic court
have already been planted. Even more so if other states actually adopt the novel
interpretation, including through the jurisprudence of their own courts.35
Third, by contrast, a domestic-court decisionmay bring about the reaction of the
forum state, or of other states. Itmay lead to an international dispute ‘maturing’ and
being subsequently settled, including before an international tribunal. It may thus
(temporarily) throw the content of the relevant international rule into uncertainty
or initiate the process that will bring about its clariﬁcation through practice or
by means of an international judicial decision. The outcome of this process may
conﬁrm the novel approach of the domestic court, resulting in the development of
the law, or it may reject it, stopping the attempt at development in its tracks.
The preceding paragraphs contain nomore than a schematic description of how
domestic courts can informally inﬂuence the process of legal development. Much
more detail is provided in the subsequent contributions, which illustrate how con-
crete decisions have affected the law in speciﬁc areas.What the introductory discus-
sion clariﬁes is the position of domestic courts within the process of international
legal development: their decisions are no sources of international law, and have
a limited formal impact; but they can exercise a powerful informal inﬂuence. In
order to do so, they need to be engaged with, and their positions endorsed by, states,
other courts, international organizations, codifying bodies, and the like. If this hap-
pens, but only then, domestic courts can indeed be seen as powerful agents of legal
development.
4. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The subsequent contributions provide examples of successful and unsuccessful,
and conscious and unconscious, attempts at legal development by domestic courts.
Whiledomestic courtshaveexercised somemeasureof inﬂuence ineachof theareas
under review, that inﬂuence has been rather differentiated. Occasionally, domestic
courts seem to have made signiﬁcant contributions to a given area of law, to the
point where key developments originate with them – perhaps most obviously in
relation to the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity.36 In a number of other
34 There have been instances where the state has appealed a decision of a domestic court in which it was
not originally a party in order to avoid the breach of an international obligation: e.g., in Tachiona v. United
States, 386 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged the
legal interest of the state to intervene in judicial proceedings between private parties, and even appeal the
decision of a lower court, where that decision would result in a breach of US international obligations.
The release of the ARA Libertad by Ghana against the decision of its own domestic court yields another
example, although there an international court haddeﬁnitively (if controversially) pronouncedon the issue:
see ‘ARA Libertad’ Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures Order of 15 December 2012, available at
http://www.itlos.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.12.2012.corr.pdf. See also
the example of the Chilean MFA intervening to overrule the Supreme Court of Chile relayed by F. Orrego-
Vicun˜a, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human Rights’, (1991) 40 ICLQ 34, 41–2.
35 See, e.g., the contribution by Van Alebeek in this symposium, especially her discussion of ‘ripple effects’.
36 See the contribution by Van Alebeek in this symposium.
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instances contributors identify selected instances of clear inﬂuence on discrete
issues, as for example in the law of state responsibility.37 Beyond that, domestic
courtshave shaped ‘visions’, as for examplewith respect to the reviewofdecisionsby
international organizations affecting human rights, with signiﬁcant ‘ripple effects’
on the international scene and the development of the law within international
organizations.38 Yet in the majority of cases, the particular inﬂuence of domestic-
court decisions has been to afﬁrm or ‘ﬁne-tune’ international law. Read in their
entirety, the subsequent contributions would seem to suggest that the inﬂuence of
domestic courts depends on three factors in particular: (i) the frequency of cases
raising issues of international law, (ii) the existence of general and possibly vague
provisions waiting to be concretized through domestic proceedings, and (iii) the
existence of ongoing codiﬁcation or clariﬁcation processes in which a particular
pronouncement is taken up.
Inaddition to illustrating the inﬂuenceofdomesticdecisionson thedevelopment
of international law, the subsequent contributions – echoing points made in Judge
Keith’s recent article,39 and almost en passant – highlight the ‘socializing’ function
of domestic proceedings on international law. In engaging with international legal
rules, domestic courts can and do contribute to their further domestication. That
in turn would seem to promote the implementation of international law in sub-
stance, lending the powerful state enforcementmechanisms to traditionallyweakly
enforced international legal regulation.
Thepicture is not all rosy, to be sure.Most contributors identify points of concern.
Perhaps the most important of those is the ‘information deﬁcit’ that plagues inter-
national lawyerswithrespect tothewealthofdomestic-court jurisprudence;another
is the poor quality of international legal argument in some domestic proceedings.
Neither problem is likely to disappear soon.However, perhaps it is not far-fetched to
hope that the current interest in domestic courts will prompt international lawyers
to learn more about the linkages between domestic law and to trace and scrutinize
domesticdecisionsfromcountriesthathavehithertonotbeensystematicallystudied
– just as much as it might lead domestic counsel and judges to seek familiarity with
international law. This is a body of law so pervasive, and intrusive that one cannot
afford to disregard it in favour of a strict focus on domestic law. What is more, as
the preceding discussion shows, it is a body of law that is not strictly separated from
domestic courts, but can be inﬂuenced by them. Precisely for that reason, impact
assessments like those conducted in this symposium’s contributions are important
in order to gauge the inﬂuence of domestic court decisions on the development of
international law.
37 See the contributions by Olleson andWittich in this symposium.
38 See the contribution by Hovell in this symposium.
39 See the keynote of the Third ILDC Colloquium, published independently in this journal: K. Keith, ‘“Inter-
national Law Is Part of the Law of the Land”: True or False?’, (2013) 26 LJIL 351.
